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Aside from a recommendation that informal combinations be subjected to
official surveillance, it is difficult to offer a solution to the problems sur-
rounding imposition of extra-contractual liability on a transferee banking
establishment. The suggestion that it would be well to allow all claims against
the new bank, leaving it to seek reimbursement from the transferor's share-
holders, is not without objection.12 4 In some cases, because of the nature
and size of the claim, it may appear fairest and most expedient to direct the
creditor's remedy, if any, against the assignee institution. 1.2  Under other
circumstances, the complaining creditor may, with justice to all concerned,
be relegated to pursuit of whatever assets have been allowed to remain with
the old bank.12 6 But there is no need of an inflexible solution. Each case
can well stand on its merits. With the copious fund of possible rationaliza-
tions, there should be no difficulty in squaring the fundamental policy of
approval of these combinations with a holding dictated by the circumstances
of the particular case.
A COMPARISON OF LAND AND MOTOR VEHICLE
REGISTRATION
THE NECESSITY of evidencing interests in land by some public record has
long been acknowledged,1 but despite prolific discussion of the various methods
adopted, perennial problems remain unsolved. In contrast, similar needs
relating to automobiles have been rationally met with a large measure of
success and a minimum of controversy. Despite the obvious differences in
the two fields, a survey of methods used and results obtained in the registra-
tion of motor vehicles may reasonably be productive of ideas for the solution
of the existing difficulties in evidencing ownership of land. For purposes of
such a comparison, it seems essential first to sketch the development and
124. While an individual creditor of the old bank would always be able to secure the
enforcement of stockholders' superadded liability, the new bank may not be in a position
to. See note 71, supra. Again, nothing may be recoverable from that direction, either
because the stockholders in question are themselves financially irresponsible, or because
their statutory liability has been exhausted by prior assessments or is insufficient to cover
the deficit.
125. It seems unduly harsh to require the holder of a small demand to undertake the
laborious and expensive process of rounding up numerous stockholders, as would be
necessary where the rule obtains that a receiver cannot be appointed for this purpose,
as in Golder v. Cervenka, 278 Ill. 409, 116 N. E. 273 (1917).
126. Cf. Mercantile Home Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 96 F. (2d) 655 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938), cert. denied, 59 Sup. Ct. 71 (1938) (claim by the Federal Government for
unpaid taxes).
1. See Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts (1924) 22 MIcH. L. Rzv. 405,
420; 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 567(a).
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present status of land registration, to show its failings and to indicate their
probable causes.
I.
Recordation of interests in land was a device evolved of expediency long
after traditions around the possession of real property had matured, and
at best it was a complicated and inconclusive method of ascertaining title
status.2 The typical recordation system, still in general use, is readily char-
acterized.3 A deed and not a memorandum is recorded, although delivery
of the deed, and not its recordation, is the operative act to convey the interest.4
But recordation, as well as preserving evidence of the deed, actually gives the
grantee his legal priority-for example, over subsequent bona fide purchasers
from the grantor. Despite the last characteristic, it is well recognized that
land recordation is defective,5 for numerous elements make the recorded title
an unreliable source of information for subsequent creditors, encumbrancers,
and purchasers. The record does not indicate the legal vaidity of recorded
deeds,6 nor rights acquired without recordation through possession,7 parol
agreements,8 or marriage and descent.9 Moreover, actual or constructive
2. See Beale, Origin of System of Recording Deeds in Aierica (1907) 19 GnRE;
BAG 335; 4 KEN, Coitm. (13th ed. 1884) § 517 et seq.
3. See Beale, supra note 2; 2 DEMBiTz, LAND TITLES (1895) § 126.
4. 2 TANY, REAL PRoPFRT (2d ed. 1920) § 567(a). Contra: X. C. CODZ Az;..
(Michie, 1935) § 3309, 3311, Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. C. 28, 8 S. E. 890 (189).
5. Chaplin, Record Title to Land (1893) 6 HAI . L REv. 302; Chaplin, Element of
Chance in Land Title (1898) 12 HARv. L. REV. 24; Ferrier, Recording Acts and Titles
by Adverse Possession and Prescription (1926) 14 CAUIF. L. REv. 287; Rood, Registration
of Land Titles (1914) 12 fCiH. L. Rmv. 379.
6. An undelivered deed is inoperative. 2 TIFFANY, REAL PRornnr, (2d ed. 1920)
§ 461. But lack of delivery cannot be discovered from the record. See Haymond, Title
Insurance Risks of Which the Public Record Gives No Notice (1928) 1 So. CAL. L RI:.
422, 425. Improper or fraudulent acknowledgment of a notary voids a deed. Tir,,.y,
op. cit. supra, at § 567(c). A deed may be set aside if the parties were incompetent.
Tucker v. Moreland, 35 U. S. 58 (1836); Essary v. Marvel, 274 IlL 576, 113 N. E. 859
(1916).
7. Adverse possession is not a matter of record. Bothin v. California Title Ins. Co.,
153 Cal. 718, 96 Pac. 500 (1908); Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038 (183). Yet such
possession may defeat record title. American Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Warren, 101 Ark. 163,
141 S. W. 765 (1911); Morse v. Seibold, 147 Ill. 318, 35 N. E. 369 (1893) ; Ogden v.
Jennings, 66 Barb. 301 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873), af'd, 62 N. Y. 526 (1875) ; Ehle %. Brown,
31 Wis. 405 (1872) ; see TIFFANy, op. cit. supra note 6 at § 571(a). Prescriptive ease-
ments may defeat record title. Shaughnessey v. Leary, 162 Mass. 103, 38 N. F- 197
(1894) ; cf. Schwartz v. Atlantic Bldg. Co., 41 App. D. C. 103 (1913).
8. Hall v. Eaton, 139 Mass. 217 (1885) (boundary agreement); Byers Y. Byers, 183
Pa. 509, 38 At. 1027 (1898) (partition agreement).
9. Rowe v. Allison, 87 Ark. 206, 112 S. W. 395 (190); Estate of Ryan, 191 Cal.
307, 216 Pac. 366 (1923) ; Schneider v. Koster, 54 Mo. 500 (1874); Smith v. Robertson,
89 N. Y. 555 (1882); Kolp v. Komp, 3 Yeates 164 (Pa. 1801). Dower and homestead
rights usually need not be recorded. Whitney v. Nicholl, 46 III. 230 (1867); Rumsey v.
Sullivan, 166 App. Div. 246, 150 N. Y. Supp. 287 (4th Dep't 1914); see Brtwszn,
CONVEYANCING (1904) §§ 373, 385, 392.
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notice of prior unrecorded claims may defeat record title.10 Remedial legis-
lation has been enacted in an attempt to cure the more flagrant difficulties,11
and equitable proceedings utilized to determine claims and interests adverse
to title,12 in each case with indifferent results. Private commercial interests
have willingly met the pressing need by preparing and insuring abstracts of
title,13 but their services are, at best, only compensatory and costly. 14 Owner-
ship has continued to be evidenced by interjected entries in books of record,
constantly increasing in number and complexity. And a universal medium
to represent ownership conclusively for marketing and security transactions
remains unsupplied.
The Torrens system of land registration came as an attempt to overcome
many of the defects in recordation methods by providing for a certified owner-
ship in land evidenced by an absolute and indefeasible title instrument. 15
10. See note 7, supra.
11. In some states transfers must be recorded within a specified period to be effective.
See NORTH AND VAN BUREN, REAL ESTATE TITLE AND CONVEYANCING (1927) 117. The
record in some instances has been made conclusive evidence of proper delivery. MAsS.
ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Coop.,'1933) c. 183, § 5, Reed v. Home Ins. Co., 4 N. E. (2d)
355 (Mass. 1936). For statute avoiding difficulties arising on variation between name
recited in deed and signature, see IOWA CODE (1935) § 10071. For other curative acts
see Barrett v. Barrett, 120 N. C. 127, 26 S. E. 691 (1897); PATTON, IOWA LAND TIma
EXAMINATiONS (1929) § 67. However, the legislature can only change rules of evidence.
Downs v. Blount, 170 Fed. 15 (C. C. A. 5th, 1909). It cannot give validity to the record
of instruments void at their inception. Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 10 So. 562
(1892); Meighen v. Strong, 6 Minn. 177 (1861).
12. See Borchard, Declaratory fudgments in the United States (1931) 37 IV. VA. L.
REv. 127; Comment (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 473. For statutory proceedings to quiet title
at law, see Hutton, Clouds on Title to Real Estate and Remedies in Pennsylvania (1927)
31 DiciNsoN L. REv. 153. Equitable proceedings to quiet title are, of course, available.
Martin v. Graves, 5 Allen 601 (Mass. 1863) ; Stewart's Appeal, 78 Pa. 88 (1876).
13. See Cushman, Torrens Title and Title Insurance (1937) 85 U. oF PA. L. REv.
589; WILLIAMS, THE WAY AND THE LAW oF TITLE INSURANCE (1929) ; NnDLAcK, Tnm
TORRENS SYSTEM (1903) 159. For the various forms of title insurance, cf. Title Ins, and
Trust Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 232, 214 Pac. 667 (1923).
14. See HOLLAND, TENURE TITL.S AND THE: TOUENS SYSTEM (1936) 14; ef.
NIBLACx, THE ToRRENS SYSTEM (1903) 145. If title is defeasible the insured may lose
possession and receive money payment. BREWSTER, CONVEYANCING (1904) §432. Title
insurance may except many doubtful matters. See Sabel, Suggestions for Amending the
Torrens Act (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 244, 248 n. 40, cf. Haymond, Title Insurance
Risks of Which Public Record Gives No Notice (1928) 1 So. CAL. L. REv. 422; 2 id, 139,
The present breakdown of title insurance companies makes some change in the system im-
perative. See VAN ScHAICK REPORT, ADMINISTRATION OF DELINQUENT TITLE AND MORT-
GAGE GUARANTY COMPANIES BY THE Nv YORI INSURANcE DEPARTMENT (1935).
15. Registration proceedings, at least in theory, do not purport to give legal title
where none existed before. See Partenfelder v. People, 157 App. Div. 462, 470, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 915, 922 (2d Dep't 1913), aff'd, 211 N. Y. 355, 105 N. E. 675 (1914) ; cf. In re
Reed, 204 Cal. 119, 266 Pac. 948 (1928). But see Mere Roihi v. Assets Co. [1905] App.
Cas. 176, 202, 210. They are essentially to afford an opportunity to determine forever the
state of title. See Swartzel, Title Registration Lessens Litigation (1922) 19 Ot1o L. 13.
AND REv. (N.S.) 679, 680; (1932) 7 NOTRE DAME LAWY. 534, 536. Some differences
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In the fifteen states where so-called Torrens systems are established,' 0 cer-
tificates of ownership 17 may be obtained generally by any person28 with power
to dispose of or appoint a legal or equitable estate in fee simple. 3 Proceedings
under these statutes may be readily divided into two categories, the judicial
proceeding in which all vested claims and interests are adjudicated and regis-
tered, and the original certificate issued; and subsequent proceedings in which
mortgages and liens are registered and interests of registered owners trans-
ferred through an administrative officer.20 Under a typical statute, initial
registration is accomplished by application to a court having chancery juris-
diction. All persons named as in possession of the premises, or having any
claim to or interest in the land must be named in the application, made
defendants, and summoned as in civil cases. The application is referred to
an examiner who may swear witnesses and hear evidence; he reports the
evidence submitted to him to the court. Finally, the decree of the court is
filed with the registrar, and a certificate of title issued to the deserving
petitioner. The judgment, however, may be reopened by parties in interest
who were not given requisite notice in the original proceedings and who assert
their claims within a statutory period, while at any time the discovery of
fraud to which a registered owner or subsequent purchaser is privy will
void the certificate of ownership.
2'1
have appeared as to whether the register or the certificate is the real source of title.
Compare Christenson v. Christenson, 109 Ore. 396, 219 Pac. 615 (1923) with Hor-
gan v. Sargent, 182 M6finn. 100, 233 N. W. 866 (1930) (purchaser of registered land not
negligent in relying solely on certificate as to amount of mortgage).
16. Cal., Colo., Ga. III., Mass., Minn., Neb.,.N. Y., N. C., N. D., Ohio, Ore., S. D.,
Va., Wash. See Pow.LL, RmiSTRATION OF THE Trr= To L .u rn- SrAm or NEw
YORK (1938) 54.
17. Initial judicial proceedings are required at present in all states. See Bordwell,
Registration of Title to Land (1927) 12 Iowa L. REv. 114, 120.
18. Two states alone require that a party be in possession to register. ,ss.
ANIx. LAWS (Lawvyer's Coop. 1933) c. 183, § 26; N. Y. RE.L Pnor. Lxv § 378, Eldert
v. Cross Country R. R. Co., 165 App. Div. 917 (N. Y. 2d Dep't 1914). Contra: CoLO.
STAT. ANN. (Mills, 1930) § 856; OHro GEN. CODE AN.m (Page, 1937) § 8572-4; ,. C.
CODE ANm. (Michie, 1935) § 2384; In, re Scott, 182 Cal. 83, 187 Pac. 9 (1920) ; Reed v.
Siddall, 94 Minn. 216, 102 N. W. 453 (1905). In Massaehusetts fle possessory rcquire.
ment does not apply to the owner of a legal estate in fee. Baumgartner v. Doherty, 2t25
Mass. 583, 190 N. E. 838 (1934). In New York it does not apply to a part), with a con-
tractual right to an estate in fee. N. Y. R.L PeoP. LAw § 378.
19. GA. CODE (1933) § 60-203; MAss. ANN. LAws (La, yer's Coop., 1933) c.
185, § 26. Applicant must establish a title good against the world. Waugh v. Glos, 246
Ill. 604, 92 N. E. 974 (1910). The nature of the interest which may be registered varies
widely. See, e.g., Willard v. Kimball, 277 Mass. 350, 178 N. E. 607 (1931) ; National
Bond & Security Co. v. Alderson, 99 Minn. 137, 108 N. IV. 861 (1906). A determinable
fee may not be registered. Institution for Savings v. Roxbury Home, 244 Mass. 583,
139 N. E. 301 (1923).
20. See ILT. Rev. STAT. (Bar Ass'n, 1937) c. 30, §§ 51 ct seq.
21. See, e.g., ILT. REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n, 1937) c. 30. §§ 70, 72; MrAss. A.!.. LAws
(Lawyer's Coop., 1933), c. 185, §45; N. Y. REAL Pop. LAv §392; also Staples, The
Conclusiveness of a Torrens Certificate of Title (1924) 8 MINN. L. RE%. 200, 201.
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Once land is registered the process in succeeding transactions is much
simpler. Mortgages and liens are registered by filing with the registrar a
certified copy of the instrument and the owner's duplicate of the certificate
of title, and new certificates with proper notations are issued.22 Similarly on
transferring any interest in registered land, a deed of conveyance and the
certificate of title are filed. Upon a showing to the registrar that the transferor
has the title or interest to be transferred, that he is entitled to make the
transfer, and that the transferee has the right to receive it, new certificates
of title will be prepared, and, as before, a duplicate given to the registered
owner.
While the desirability of land registration is admitted, its practicability as
at present administered is widely denied.23 The denial is not without factual
support, for only fifteen states have a Torrens system and then merely as an
alternative to recordation.24 Even in the area of its greatest use less than
twenty per cent of the land is in Torrens,2 5 while some statutes have gone
almost completely unused. 26 Beside this striking fact of disuse, all other
criticisms pale. But they are relevant as possible explanations of the inertia
on the part of the landowning public which has proved disastrous to a
theoretically useful system.
One frequent criticism of Torrens registration in the United States has
been that the certificate is neither conclusive nor indefeasible, although a
certificate of title is valueless unless it conclusively establishes the ownership
indicated on its face.27 The case law provides some foundation for this rebuke.
Thus, specified procedural prerequisites to registration have been deemed
jurisdictional, 28 so that the registration decree could be avoided although'
22. No right or interest in registered land in derogation of that of a registered owner
can be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. See, e.g., GA. CoDE (1933) § 60-423;
N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 401; Abrahamson v. Sundman, 174 Minn. 22, 218 N. W. 246
(1928) ; MASSACHUSETTS CoNvEYANcERs Ass'N, Land Court of Massachusetts (1936) 5;
Staples, supra note 21 at 215. This provision has had some importance in encouraging
the use of registration. See POWELL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 233.
23. See Bordwell, op. cit. supra note 17 at 137; McCall, The Torrens Systein--After
Thirty-Five Years (1932) 10 N. C. L. REv. 329, 330; Wright, The Torrens Decepltion
(1931) 54 N. J. L. J. 202; (1932) 25 LAW. & BANK. 226; Pros and Cons of the Title
System (1918) 11 LAw. & BANK. 163.
24. No state in the United States has any compulsory provision in its registration
statute. PoW xL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 71.
25. See POWELL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 145.
26. See POWELL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 55.
27. See Cushman, Torrens Title and Title Ins. (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 589,
595; Niblack, The Conclusiveness of Torrens Certificates of Title (1913) 19 CAS. &
Com. 727; Niblack, Pivotal Points of the Torrens System (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 274, 277;
Common Sense v. Torrens Fallacy (1933) 26 LAw. & BANK. 236, 237; Pow=., op. cit.
supra note 16 at 33, n. 118, 93 (inconclusiveness of the certificate has destroyed the Tor-
rens System in California).
28. Hammel v. Feigh, 143 Minn. 115, 173 N. W. 570 (1919). Registration is no de-
fense where land has been transferred in fraud of creditors. Morris v. Small, 160 Fed.
142 (C. C. D. Mass. 1908) ; Cunningham v. Bright, 228 Mass. 385, 117 N. E. 909 (1917).
Contra: Pick & Co. v. Natalby, 211 Ill. App. 486 (1918). It is not fraud to register
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the statutory period for attacking it had passed. This type of attack occurs
most frequently when tenants or occupants of the land, lienholders, or other
known parties in interest have not been served with summons to the initial
proceedings in strict accordance with statutory requirements. On the other
hand, bona fide purchases for value usually do not suffer defeasance because
of such "fraud," 30 and in several states a statutory period of limitations checks
delayed attacks upon registration, even when fraudulently obtained.3 1 Like-
wise, parties not served but having actual notice have been estopped from
asserting claims.32 In one instance, it is true, confessed mutual mistake
operated to the benefit of an unregistered claimant, but generally3 4 mistake
or error has not been deemed jurisdictional and the decree has remained
unassailable after the statute of limitations has run. Similarly, decrees have
survived various procedural irregularities, such as the obtaining of title
through an erroneous tax sale,3 5 or the misapprehension or omission of in-
terests of parties,30 and as to matters recited in the decrees.
3 7
though registrant knows of an outstanding unregistered interest. Bjornberg v. Myers, 212
Ill. App. 257 (1918); see Innes, Notice and Fraud in Registration of Title to Land
(1915) 31 L. Q. Rnv. 397; Staples, op. cit. supra note 21 at 204; cf. Garlick ,. Imgruet,
340 Ill. 136, 172 N. E. 164 (1930) ; Cline Y. Hammond, 48 Ohio App. 228, 192 N. E. S69
(1933).
29. Moaldey v. Los Angeles, Pac. Ry., 99 Cal. App. 74, 277 Pac. 83 (1929); Chi-
cago Title & Tr. Co. v. Darley, 363 IlL 197, 1 N. E. (2d) 846 (1936); Baart -.. Martin,
99 Minn. 197, 108 N. V. 945 (1906); ef. Rasch v. Rasch, 278 Ill. 261, 115 N. E. 871
(1917); In re Application of Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 226 N. IV. 201 (1929). But cf. Floral
Park lutual Fuel Co. v. Fiske, 128 Misc. 349, 218 N. Y. Supp. 128 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
appeal dismissed, 220 App. Div. 778, 222 N. Y. Supp. 804 (2d Dep't 1927), appeal dis-
missed, 246 N. Y. 622, 159 N. E. 676 (1927).
30. See, e.g., CAr Gaw. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8589, § 37; Omo GE:. Corm
A-.. (Page, 1937) § 8572-22; Eliason v. Wilborn, 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. 101 (1929) ;
Morse v. City of Revere, 248 Mass. 569, 143 N. E. 621 (1924); Henry v. White, 123
Minn. 182, 143 N. W. 324 (1913). But ef. Follette v. Pacific L & P. Corp., 189 Cal.
193, 208 Pac. 295 (1922).
31. GA. CoDE (1933) § 60-419; N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 392; OHio GE-. CoDE Az.'.
(Page, 1937) § 8572-22. But cf. Couey v. Talalah Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 183 S. E.
822 (1936).
32. Gill v. Francis Investment Co., 19 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
33. Bruce v. Superior Land Co., 65 Wash. 681, 118 Pac. 910 (1911).
34. It is conceivable that findings of fact or law in another suit, later vacated, and
used meanwhile as evidence in certifying title might be jurisdictional, not mere irregu-
larity. See BuL.. FEnm-.L FRuX LOAN Bunm.,u, LxAD TiTLE r rsT. .Trow Y C=Fi-
cAT (1918) 59; Quinn, Land Titlesin Illinois and Indiana As Affected by Infant Disabil-
ity Statutes (1924) 18 ILL L. REv. 447, 470. In one instance, however, under similar circum-
stances, the rights of an innocent purchaser relying on the decree of registration ware
deemed not to have been affected. Stewart v. Kellough, 104 Ohio St. 347, 135 N. E. 603
(1922) ; cf. White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959 (1917).
35. Terry v. Collins, 146 Misc. 483, 261 N. Y. Supp. 472 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
36. Jones v. York County, 26 F. (2d) 623 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); City of Ne%, York
v. Wright, 243 N. Y. 80, 152 N. E. 472 (1926); cf. Gerbig v. Spelts, 89 Colo. 201, 300
Pac. 606 (1931); Rubin v. Smith, 122 Misc. 5, 202 N. Y. Supp. 861 (Sup. Ct. 1923),
aff'd without opinion, 210 App. Div. 876, 206 N. Y. Supp. 955 (Ist Dep't 1924).
37. Gerbig v. Spelts, 89 Colo. 201, 300 Pac. 606 (1931); Malaguti v. Rosen, 262
Mass. 555, 160 N. E. 532 (1928); Terry v. Collins, 146 Misc. 483, 261 N. Y. Supp. 472
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After property has been registered under Torrens statutes, the operative
act to convey an interest in the property is registration of the deed of con-
veyance,38 and no unregistered estate, interest or claim is valid against a
registered owner or bona fide purchaser, with a few exceptions." Strict con-
struction of the statutes has usually given priority to registered interests
despite notice of prior unregistered conveyances.40 Similar rules apply to
liens and encumbrances. 41 Even possession of registered land under an tin-
registered claim has been held not to give constructive notice of the possessor's
prior claim to subsequent creditors of the registered owner.42 In a few cases
the certificate has failed of conclusiveness, as where a mortgagor died before
registering his mortgage,43 or where a mortgage was discharged by payment
to the mortgagee despite a previous registered assignment of his interest,4
4
or where an easement was not registered on the certificate of the servient
tenement. 45 But despite these and other occasional loopholes, 40 it seems clear
(Sup. Ct. 1932). A registered owner who intrusted his certificate to a defrauder has been
estopped from asserting his claim. Eliason v. Wilburn, 335 Ill. 352, 167 N. E. 101 (1929).
38. See, e.g., CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1937) Act 8589, § 55; ILL. REV. STAT. (Bar
Ass'n, 1937) c. 30, § 98; MAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Coop., 1933) c. 185, § 57. Un-
registered voluntary instruments are operative as contracts in some states. MAss, ANN.
LAWS (Lawyer's Coop., 1933) c. 185, § 57; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8203; see
Hogg, Registration of Title to Land (1918) 28 YALE L. J. 51, 55.
39. For typical exceptions see MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) c. 65, § 8271. MAss, ANN.
LAWS (Lawyer's Coop., 1933) c. 185, § 46 and N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 400 make addi-
tional exceptions in certain cases for easements.
40. Altosino v. Altosino, 363 Ill. 437, 2 N. E. (2d) 709 (1936) ; Doyle v. Wagner,
108 Minn. 443, 122 N. W. 316 (1909); Dillon v. Broeker, 178 N. C. 65, 100 S. E, 191
(1919) ; cf. Flesher v. Craft, 148 Ore. 633, 38 P. (2d) 59 (1934). Several judicial quali-
fications surround the rule but do not appear to have destroyed its essence. Thus common
law dedication of a roadway is not affected by registration provisions. Hooper v. Haas,
332 Ill. 561, 164 N. E. 23 (1928). Unregistered contracts to convey land are operative
between the original parties. Forest Preserve Dist. v. Emerson, 341 Il. 442, 173 N. E,
477 (1930) ; Cook v. Luettich, 191 Minn. 6, 252 N. W. 649 (1934).
41. Hammond Lumber Co. v. Moore, 104 Cal. App. 528, 286 Pac. 504 (1930) ; Bjorn-
berg v. Myers, 212 I1. App. 257 (1918) ; In re Lee, 171 Minn. 182, 213 N. W. 736 (1927) ;
Gough Lumber Co. v. Crawford, 124 Ohio St. 46, 176 N. E. 677 (1931); McMullen v.
Croft, 96 Wash. 275, 164 Pac. 930 (1917), reversing, 92 Wash. 411, 159 Pac. 375 (1916) ;
Larse v. Campbell, 186 Wash. 319, 57 P. (2d) 1246 (1936); cf. Dyal v. Watson, 174 Ga.
330, 162 S. E. 682 (1932).
42. Sterling Nat'l Bank v. Fischer, 75 Colo. 371, 226 Pac. 146 (1924) ; Bjornberg v.
Myers, 212 Ill. App. 257 (1918); Abrahamson v. Sundman, 174 Minn. 22, 218 N. W.
246 (1928) ; In re Application of Juran, 178 Minn. 55, 226 N. W. 201 (1929).
43. Carlson v. Carlson, 124 Cal. App. 207, 12 P. (2d) 165 (1932); Federal Nat'l
Bank v. Gaston, 256 Mass. 471, 152 N. E. 923 (1926).
44. Rea v. Kelly, 183 Minn. 194, 235 N. W. 910 (1931); see Grace v. Kuebler, 39 D.
L. R. 39, 47, 56 Can. Sup. Ct. 1, 14 (1917) ; Nioa v. Bell, 27 Vict. L. R. 82, 85 (1901) ;
cf. Pioneer Abstract and Title Guaranty Co. v. Feraud, 91 Cal. App. 278, 267 Pac, 134
(1928); Sanders v. Stenger, 117 Minn. 424, 136 N. W. 4 (1912).
45. Minnetonka State Bank v. Minnesota State Sunshine Soc., 189 Minn. 560, 250
N. W. 561 (1933). But cf. Dubinsky v. Cama, 261 Mass. 47, 158 N. E. 321 (1927) (if
certificate of servient tenement shows easement it is sufficient).
46. A further source of inconclusiveness is variation between description of land in
application for registration and in the certificate. Petition of Furness, 62 Cal. App. 753,
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that the almost complete failure to utilize the existing state Torrens systems
cannot fairly be attributed in the main to the inconclusiveness of certificates.
Far more potent as a factor in preventing the use of Torrens statutes has
been the powerful lobby of vested interests seeking to conserve the profitable
business of preparing and insuring abstracts of title dependent upon the
continuance of the recordation system.47 To this end dissuasion of legislature
and public from the enactment of Torrens statutes was the most direct method
employed. If that were impossible, a substitute was the passage of Torrens
statutes so complicated as to be unusable.4 , Finally, even though a feasible
system were enacted, banks could be coerced into requiring insured titles,
whether recorded or registered, as security for loans, so as to destroy com-
pletely the advantage of having land registered. 9 Similarly, some members
of the bar have very naturally concluded that once land were registered title
searching would cease and have used their influence in opposition to changes 9
However, were the advantages of land registration sufliciently recognized
and the method of registration so expeditious and inexpensive that registration
should become popular, such sabotage could not prevent, though it might
delay, eventual universal registration.
The third cause for the failure of existing Torrens statutes thus becomes
of paramount importance. The criticism is that to register land initially
through the required judicial proceedings involves great expense and pro-
longed litigation, as well as inviting adverse claimants. 1 Probably, so long
as it is assumed that an initial judicial proceeding is required, the most
convenient method would be an in ren proceeding with notice by publication.
And analogies from certain admiralty,82 equitable m and statutory proceed-
218 Pac. 61 (1923); Studley v. Yip, 245 Mass. 242, 139 N. . 485 (1923). If adjoining
owner is made a defendant in the proceedings unnecessarily, the petition is demurrable.
Duffey v. Rodriguez, 139 App. Div. 755, 124 N. Y. Supp. 529 (2d Dep't 1910).
47. See McCall, The Torrens System-Ater Thirty Fve Ycars (1932) 10 . C. L.
REi. 329, 349.
48. See McCall, supra note 47; POWELL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 16.
49. See Common Sense v. Torrens Fallacy (1933) 26 LAW. & B.%_ 236; Ciuhmn,
supra note 27 at 595.
50. See Fairchild and Gluck, Various Aspects of Compudsory Land Registration
(1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rmn 545, 546. But see Patton, The Vcd for a Section of Land
Title Law (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 666, 667 (in a few states both the city la%,yer and the
country lawyer have already been eliminated from title practice by title cimpanics).
51. See Bordwell, supra note 17, at 135; Fairchild anid Gltck, supra note 59 at
549; BuLL. FEDERAL FARmt LOAN BuRmu, LANa TITL RErSTRnxr0: By CtaiFW,
(1918) 40; McCall, supra note 47 at 341; NILACK, ThE Tnmze.s Sys.-Tr (1903) 45, 75.
52. See Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass. 71, 77, 55 N. E. 812, 814 (1q00).
53. Actions quia timnet: 2 SToRY, EQtu-rl JURISPRL'PExCE (14th ed. 1Q18) § 1141
et seq. To enforce collection of taxes against land, to partition real estate, for condemna-
tion of land: Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 727, 734 (1877); Shepherd v. Ware, 46
Minn. 174, 176, 48 N. AV. 773, 774 (1891). To determine adverse interests in land pur-
chased at sheriff's sale: Parker v. Overman, 18 How. 137, 140 (U. S. 1855); Clark v.
Smith, 13 Pet. 195, 203 (U. S. 1839); Arnold v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316, 323 (1890).
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ings5 4 appear to support the constitutionality of such a procedure. But
decisionsr5 and current5 6 opinion have emphasized that if there are judicial
proceedings they must be in personam with personal service on known claim-
ants and service by publication only upon unknown and non-resident parties
in interest. Whether the original judicial proceedings were entirely in rent
or not, registration would continue to involve voluntary assumption of a
lawsuit which would remain an undertaking incompatible with the usual
comfortable inertia of the landowner.
II.
Among the various types of registration statutes rapidly becoming familiar
in other fields than land, those governing automobiles are chosen for com-
parison because whatever the particular nature of the various motor vehicle
acts, automobile registration must of necessity function faultlessly through
intricate and successive security and marketing transactions.5 At the outset
certain obvious differences in the problems of automobile and land registra-
tion may be recognized. Principally at the time of initial registration, auto-
mobiles, unlike land, are new, rendering ownership, liens or encumbrances
correspondingly easy to determine; moreover, the life span of the motor
vehicle is relatively short, while interests in land have bad an indefinite period
of time in which to accumulate and to become obscured.58 On the other hand,
the mobility and difficulty in identification of automobiles should tend to
increase the problems of registration. But such differences seemingly should
not affect the essential nature of the issues involved so as to be fatal to a
comparison.
It is impossible to generalize in detail as to the nature of motor vehicle
acts, for there is wide variety in statute and decision. But especially significant
in comparison with the cumbersome courtroom method of the Torrens system
is the fact that under one group of statutes, the title evidenced by registration
Escheat: Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256 (1896). Probate of wills: Bonnemort v.
Gill, 167 Mass. 338, 340, 45 N. E. 768, 769 (1897) ; Hamilton 17. Brown, supra at 274.
54. See Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 348, 350 (U. S. 1850) ; also Burnain v.
Commonwealth, 62 Ky. 210, 211 (1864) (constructive notice is a question of legislative
intent).
55. People v. Chase, 165 I11. 527, 46 N. E. 454 (1896) ; State v. Guilbert, 56 Ohio St.
575, 47 N. E. 551 (1897) (registration proceedings have least possible atialogy to 1iro-
ceedings in ren). But see Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 262 (1907) ; Am. Land Co. v.
Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47, 66 (1911); Title and Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150
Cal. 289, 307, 88 Pac. 356, 359 (1906); Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 45, 90 Pac.
129, 131 (1907) ; Drake v. Frazer, 105 Neb. 162, 166, 179 N. W. 393, 395 (1920).
56. Bordwell, supra note 17, at 120; NIBLACK, Tim TORRENS SYSTEM (1903) 23
POWELL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 58.
57. See Adelson, The Mechanics of the Installment Credit Sale (1935) 2 LAW &
CONTEmp. PRoB. 218.
58. See Gilman v. Tucker, 128 N. Y. 190, 199, 28 N. E. 1040, 1042 (1891) ; Elidel-
bach v. Davis, 99 S. W. (2d) 1067, 1072 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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has been made conclusive, despite the absence of any judicial proceedings in
the registration process.59 Procedure under this type of statute may be
illustrated by the Montana law of 1937.'- In the application for registration
the interest of the owner and the names and interest of any conditional sales
vendor, mortgagee, or other lienholder are stated. The registrar of motor
vehicles issues a certificate of registration to the applicant "owner" and a
certificate of ownership to the "legal owner," who may be the owner as well,
or, for example, a conditional sales vendor. On transferring an interest in
a vehicle, the certificates of ownership or registration or both are assigned
to the transferee, who forwards them to the registrar and the registrar issues
to the new owners the proper new certificates. Until such new certificates
are issued no delivery is deemed to have been made, nor is title deemed to
have passed, and the intended transfer is incomplete and invalid. No chattel
mortgage or conditional sales contract is valid against creditors, subsequent
encumbrancers, or purchasers until and unless the mortgagee or conditional
sales vendor is registered as "legal owner." Mortgages and conditional sales
contracts are noted on the certificate when sent to the registrar accompanied
by the certificate of title and the deposit of such instruments with the registrar
constitutes constructive notice. 61
Although this type of statute is relatively recent and scarcely litigated, the
results of its several provisions may be determined by observations elsewhere.
Thus, while under many motor vehicle statutes title papers do not purport
to be conclusive, in the states having provisions similar to the Montana
statute, conclusive and indefeasible title certificates have in most instances
been obtained. The states may be classified into three groups in reference
to conclusiveness. In the first group, the statutes are, for the most part,
penal in nature,02 and are construed by the courts as having been adopted for
revenue purposes,63 .to identify automobiles and their users," to assure that
59. See CAi. VETHIlE CODE (Deering, 1937) §§ 186, 195; Micn. ST,%T. A;:.
(1937) § 9.1474, Bos v. Holleman De Weerd Auto Co., 246 lich. 578, 225 N. NV. 1
(1929), MIcia. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1938) §9.1497; Mfo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 19P2) c.
41, § 7774(c) ; Mont. Laws (1937) c. 72, §§ 1759 et seq.; Ouio GEN. CoDo A:.-;. (Page,
1937) §§ 6290-4, 6290-9; Utah Laws (1935) c. 46, §§ 71, 79; Comment (1932-) 20 CALW.
L. Ry. 180; (1929) 13 MiNx. L. REv. 616; (1934) 12 Nma. L B. 399.
60. Special provisions are made for the sale of second-hand cars to dealers, and for
the transfer of motor vehicles by operation of law. See Mont. Laws (1937) c. 72,
§ 1759 et seq.
61. See also Utah Laws (1935) c. 46, § 64.
62. See Williams v. Stringfield, 76 Colo. 343, 346, 231 Pac. 658, 659 (1924); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, 171 At. 446, 448 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934); Davis v. Gross-
man, 201 Minn. 156, 157, 275 N. AV. 858. 859 (1937) ; Hartford ,Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight,
146 Mfiss. 862, 870, 111 So. 748, 749 (1927); Bond Lumber Co. v. Timmons, 8 Mfont.
497, 501, 267 Pac. 802, 803 (1928) ; Parrott v. Gulick, 145 Okla. 129, 130, 292 Pac. 48,
50 (1930).
63. Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 264, 158 Ad. 545 (1932) ; Bolton-Svanby Co.
v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 164, 275 N. V. 855 (1937).
64. See Ricker v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 290 Mfass. 111, 113, 194 N. E. 815
(1935).
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vehicles are mechanically fit,65 but not particularly to evidence ownership.
These statutes are not interpreted as varying the rights and equities of suc-
cessive purchasers and encumbrancers of automobiles,0 0 and sales acts have
not been affected. 67 Moreover, in the states of this group requiring that title
papers show on their face all liens and encumbrances against the vehicle,
recordation statutes are not superseded by the automobile registration acts;
and a failure to comply with the latter merely subjects violators to a criminal
penalty.' 8 In a second group, 9 the statutes as judicially construed, give
65. Gonchar v. Kelson, 114 Conn. 262, 264, 158 Atl. 545 (1932).
66. Littell v. Brayton Motor & Accessory Co., 70 Colo. 286, 201 Pac. 34 (1921);
Daniel v. Surratt, 97 Colo. 43, 46 P. (2d) 903 (1935); Celina Mutual Casualty Co. v.
Baldridge, 5 N. E. (2d) 991 (Ind. 1937); Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S. W. (2d)
873 (1929); Bolton-Swanby Co. v. Owens, 201 Minn. 162, 275 N. W. 855 (1937);
McNeil v. Larson, 171 Okla. 608, 43 P. (2d) 397 (1935) ; Braham v. Steinard-HIannon
Motor Co., 97 Pa. Super. 19 (1929).
67. Cerex Co. v. Peterson, 203 Iowa 355, 212 N. W. 890 (1927). Consideration
given in exchange for motor vehicles has not failed because of noncompliance. Gut.
ridge v. State, 37 Ohio App. 1, 173 N. E. 447 (1930). But certificate of title and regis-
tration are deemed prima facie evidence of ownership. Pacific Finance Co. v. Gherna,
36 Ariz. 509, 287 Pac. 304 (1930); Maxwell Co. v. Southern Ore. Gas Corp., 74 P. (2d)
594, rehearing denied, 75 P. (2d) 9 (Ore. 1937); Campbell v. Fretts, 167 Wash, 576,
9 P. (2d) 1082 (1932). But this presumption is generally rebuttable with regard to
owner's liability for automobile accidents. Farrelly v. Heuacker, 118 Fla. 340, 159 So. 24
(1935); Tigue Sales Co. v. Reliance Motor Co., 207 Iowa 567, 221 N. W. 514 (1928).
In Massachusetts the presumption of ownership is not rebuttable with regard to auto-
mobile accidents. Faria v. Veras, 10 N. E. (2d) 267 (Mass. 1937). There is ail apparent
conflict in Massachusetts as to whether an unregistered owner has an insurable interest.
Compare Caccavo v. Kearney, 286 Mass. 480, 190 N. E. 817 (1934) with Geary v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 15 N. E. (2d) 238 (Mass. 1938). The equitable owner and po.sessor
of an automobile also has an insurable interest although his title is unregistered. Celina
v. Mutual Casualty Co. v. Baldridge, 5 N. E. (2d) 991 (Ind. 1937); Fagg v. Mass.
Bonding & Ins. Co., 142 Ore. 358, 19 P. (2d) 413 (1933).
68. In re Rosen, 23 F. (2d) 687 (D. Md. 1928) ; Meyer Herson Auto Sales Co. v.
Faunkhauser, 65 F. (2d) 655 (App. D. C. 1933); Slagle v. Securities Investment Co.,
131 Neb. 319, 268 N. W. 294 (1936) ; King-Godfrey v. Rogers, 157 Okla. 216, 11 P. (2d)
935 (1932) ; cf. Prather v. Auto Industrial Corp., 96 Colo. 516, 45 P. (2d) 628 (1935). In
these states a transferor having obtained a certificate through fraud cannot pass a
good title even to an innocent purchaser for value. Winship v. Standard Finance Co.,
40 Ariz. 382, 12 P. (2d) 282 (1932); Abels v. Nat'l Bond & Investment Co., 13 N. E.
(2d) 903 (Ind. 1938) ; Automobile Banking Corp. v. Draper, 129 Pa. Super. 501, 195 Atl.
441 (1937). The significance of such decisions is questionable for if it is not necessary
to assign a certificate of title for a valid transfer, fraud in obtaining the certificate has
little relevancy. See (1938) 4 U. OF Pirs. L. RE~v. 123. Moreover, failure of a motor
vehicle official to ascertain the true legal owner for proper notation on the title certifi-
cate has been held not to have affected the legal rights of the owner. Skid Evans v.
Patten, 78 Utah 116, 1 P. (2d) 959 (1931); cf. Robertson v. Snider, 63 S. W. (2d) 508
(Mo. App. 1933).
69. California falls within this group despite a statute requiring strict compliance
to pass any title or interest due to a relaxation of the statute by judicial construction.
Thus, lack of compliance is held not conclusive under equitable principles where right of
possession is involved and claimant has such right or where circumstances are such as
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greater importance to certificates of title as evidence of interests in motor
vehicles. While instruments of title in these states are not sufficient to convey
title, transfer of an instrument may be cause for an action of specific per-
formance7 0 and innocent parties relying on the statute requiring registration
may acquire legal rights superior to the interests of the real ovmer.71
In a third group, statutes similar to the Montana law are designed to
prevent traffic in stolen automobiles, and fraud on innocent purchasers,7 and
to register all claims and interests in motor vehicles in one conclusive title
instrument.7" In these states, sales and transfers not in strict compliance with
the registration acts are held fraudulent and void ab initio.74 The failure
of an owner to assign his certificate of title upon a sale or transfer of a car
renders him liable in the event of an accident in which the purchaser or
to work an estoppel. Tharp v. San Joaquin Valley Securities Corp., 66 P. (2d) 230 (Cal.
App. 1937). In absence of estoppel noncompliance would not deter right to possession in
action of claim and delivery. Parke v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, =8 Pac. 435 (1924);
see True v. Crane, 119 Cal. App. 653, 657, 7 P. (2d) 357, 359 (1932) ; cf. Herbert Co.
v. Powell, 90 Cal. App. 782, 266 Pac. 620 (1928) ; see Comment (1932) 20 CALnF. L R ,.
180. However, compliance is deemed essential to complete a transfer. Chelhar v. Acme
Garage, 61 P. (2d) 1232 (Cal. 1936). But some property may pass although no certifi-
cate is assigned. -Moody v. Goodwin, 53 Cal. App. 693, 200 Pac. 733 (1921); see Sly v.
American Indemnity Co., 127 Cal. App. 202, 15 P. (2d) 522, 524 (1932). In the absence
of intervening rights a transfer in possession of a vehicle may be necessary to convey
title. Washington Lumber & Millwork Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13, 1 P. (2d) 437
(1931) ; c. Barnett v. 'Marsili, 131 Cal. App. 337, 21 P. (2d) 650 (1933). In Vota%,,w V.
Farmers Automobile Inter-Insurance Exchange, 76 P. (2d) 1174 (Cal. 1938) it is sug-
gested that a vendor transferring possession without compliance ith the statute passes
equitable title, retains legal title, and would not seem to be the sole and unconditional
owner.
70. Gaub v. Mosher, 129 At. 253 (N. J. Ch. 1925); cf. Stein v. Scarpa, 96 N. J. I.
86, 114 AtI. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1921) (on failure to assign bill of sale consideration failed and
purchaser has right to rescind) ; Merchants' Securities Corp. v. Lane, 106 N. J. L 576,
150 At. 559 (1930) (purchaser from dealer without notice of claim of original owner
who had not transferred bill of sale to dealer was not entitled to prevail as against the
owner).
71. See Commercial Credit Co. v. MfcNelly, 171 At. 446, 449 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934);
cf. Neppach v. Mitchell, 132 Ore. 395, 285 Pac. 1109 (1930) ; Thiering v. Gage, 132 Ore.
92, 284 Pac. 832 (1930) (taking certificate of title amounted to symbolic delivery where
attaching creditor bad notice); United States F. & G. Co. v. Allen, 158 Tean. 504, 14
S. V. (2d) 724 (1929). Purchaser can refuse payment until certificate is assigned.
Pacific Finance Co. v. Gherna, 36 Ariz. 509, 287 Pac. 304 (1930).
72. See Parke v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 292, 228 Pac. 435, 439 (1924); Swartz v.
White, 80 Utah 150, 158, 13 P. (2d) 643, 646 (1932).
73. See Hoshaw v. Fenton, 110 S. AV. (2d) 1140, 1143 (Mto. App. 1937); In re
Wroth's Estate, 125 Neb. 832, 835, 252 N. IV. 322, 323 (1934); Sauls v. Andrews, 163
Va. 407, 415, 175 S. E. 760, 763 (1934).
74. Morris v. Firemen's Ins. Co., 121 Kan. 482, 247 Pac. 852 (1926); Kimber v.
Eding, 262 Mich. 670, 247 N. XV. 777 (1933) ; State v. Trimble, 335 Mto. 213, 72 S. 1V.
(2d) 111 (1934); Hoshaw v. Fenton, 110 S. AV. (2d) 1140 (Mto. App. 1937); Sauls v.
Andrews, 163 Va. 407, 175 S. E. 760 (1934); cf. Kruse v. Carey, 259 Mid. 157, 242
N. AV. 873 (1932) ; Drown v. Tough, 225 Mto. App. 1017, 38 S. V. (2d) 735 (1931).
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transferee was at fault.7 5 Moreover, failure to comply with the statute pre-
cludes any insurable interest.7 6 The acts provide that notation of liens and
encumbrances on the certificates of title constitutes constructive notice even
,without possession of the chattel,7 7 and the provisions have usually been
strictly construed with the general result that certificates of ownership are,
in this regard, conclusive and indefeasible.78 Noncompliance, however, has
not invalidated liens and encumbrances between the original parties,7 as
against parties with notice,80 and in the case of liens dependent upon posses-
sion.8 But compliance is essential to give priority over subsequent creditors
and purchasers without actual notice.8 2 A mistake in the number on a
certificate of title has voided a mortgage,83 and failure of a motor vehicle
commissioner to register a prior lien after proper application has postponed
the rights of the lienholder8 4 The Montana court, in an early construction
of its statute, seemed to contravene statutory provisions by intimating that
estoppel would protect a bona fide purchaser for value when - registered
owner had placed the property in the hands of an established dealer with
75. Bunch v. Kin, 2 Cal. App. (2d) 81, 37 P. (2d) 744 (1934) ; Schmidt v. Com-
mercial Inv. Trust Corp., 14 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 57 P. (2d) 1016 (1936) ; Le Hay v. Nel-
son, 273 Mich. 435, 263 N. W. 419 (1935) ; Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N. Y. 189, 2 N. E.
(2d) 536 (1936). Where the conditional vendor or mortgagee is registered a "legal
owner" he is immunized by statute or decision from liability and the rcgistered owner,
as the one entitled to possession, is held liable. CAL. VEHICLE CODE (Deering, 1937)
§ 402(f), O'Neill v. Williams, 127 Cal. App. 385, 15 P. (2d) 879 (1932); Iowa Acts
(1937) c. 134, §82; Coombes v. Letcher, 104 Mont. 371, 66 P. (2d) 769 (1937).
76. Barton v. Mercantile Ins. Co., 127 Kan. 271, 273 Pac. 408 (1929) ; State v. Cox,
306 Mo. 537, 268 S. W. 87 (1924) ; Mathes v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 6 S. W. (2d)
66 (Mo. 1928) ; Evens v. Home Ins. Co., 231 Mo. App. 932, 82 S. W. (2d) 111 (1935)
Thomas v. Mullins, 153 Va. 383, 149 S. E. 494 (1929).
77. Supra note 59.
78. Dennes v. Butts, 90 F. (2d) 522 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) ; In re Fell, 16 F. Supp.
987 (E. D. Pa. 1936) ; Abdallah v. Jacob, 40 P. (2d) 918 (Cal. App. 1935) ; Chelhar v.
Acme Garage, 61 P. (2d) 1232 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1936) ; Ittelson v. Hagan, 245 Mich. 56,
222 N. W. 145 (1928) ; Braham & Co. v. Surrell, 115 Pa. Super. 365, 176 At. 64 (1934);
Truitt v. Patten, 75 Utah 567, 287 Pac. 175 (1930); cf. Tharp v. San Joaquin Valley
Securities Co., 66 P. (2d) 230 (Cal. App. 1937) (exposed for sale and unregistered).
79. Winne v. Ford, 88 Cal. App. 308, 263 Pac. 545 (1928) ; Sunbury Finance Co.
v. Boyd Motor Co., 119 Pa. Super. 412, 180 Atl. 103 (1935).
80. See Chelhar v. Acme Garage, 61 P. (2d) 1232, 1233 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1936).
81. Ariz. Laws (1937) c. 67, § 1648a; Utah Laws (1935) c. 46, § 73. Some states
contemplate a change in possession as well as registration to give effect to liens. Wash-
ington Lumber & Mill Work Co. v. McGuire, 213 Cal. 13, 1 P. (2d) 437 (1931); Daniel
v. Surratt, 97 Colo. 43, 46 P. (2d) 903 (1935); Drew v. Feuer, 185 Minn. 133, 240
N. XV. 114 (1931). But cf. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon Supp. 1938) tit. 75, § 38.
82. Eckhardt v. Morley, 220 Cal. 229, 30 P. (2d) 423 (1934); Barnett v. Marsill,
131 Cal. App. 337, 21 P. (2d) 650 (1933) ; National Cash Register v. Boardman, 331 Pa,
158, 200 AtI. 73 (1938).
83. Robertson v. Snider, 63 S. W. (2d) 508 (Mo. App. 1933) ; cf. Commercial Inv.
Trust Corp. v. Machen, 40 F. (2d) 321 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
84. Maryland Credit Finance Corp. v. Franklin Credit Finance Corp., 164 Va, 579,
180 S. E. 408 (1935).
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actual or apparent authority to sell.85 But the court did not rest on that
reasoning and reasserted the strict requirements of the Act, placing its decision
on other grounds.8 6 Finally, in states giving conclusive effect to a certificate,
the true owner has been estopped from asserting any rights against a pur-
chaser who relied on a certificate fraudulently obtained, when the fraud was
made possible through his own non-compliance with statutory requirements.87
Indeed remarkable, when compared to the hesitancy of courts when adjudi-
cating rights in land, is the extent to which conclusiveness has been imparted
to certificates of title representing a great variety of conflicting property
rights in automobiles.
Turning to the more crucial problem of expense in registration, actual costs
to the registrant cannot reasonably be compared with the cost of registration
under the real property statutes, because motor vehicle acts are in part
taxation measures.8 Nevertheless, it is clear that the initial judicial pro-
ceeding involved in land registration makes the Torrens system more ex-
pensive, as well as less expeditious. The plan of the original Australian
Torrens system and of the first state statute in the United Statesso provided
for registration without the judicial proceeding, but "due process" and the
nondelegability of judicial duties to administrative officers were held in some
cases to make such a procedure unconstitutional under national and state con-
stitutions.90 For some reason, a few courts have consistently and jealously
maintained that the determination of vested interests in and claims to land
requires findings of fact and of law which can be made only by a judicial
tribunal 9 -together with a jury, in some states.02 Accordingly, it has on
85. In Pennsylvania registration of a chattel mortgage does not give constructive
notice without a transfer of possession. Kaufmann & Baer v. Monroe Motor Line Trans-
portation Co., 124 Pa. Super. 27, 187 Ati. 296 (1936). This may be attributed to the
peculiar status of chattel mortgages in that state. Maus v. Majestic Apt House Co.,
250 Pa. 194, 95 Atl. 451 (1915).
86. Rasmussen v. Lee & Co., Inc., 104 Mont. 278, 66 P. (2d) 119 (1937). The court
placed its decision on the ground that defendant repossessed the car without obtaining
reassignment of the certificate of title.
87. Wallich v. Sandlovich, 111 Neb. 318, 196 N. IV. 317 (1923); Armstrong v.
Boomansour, 223 App. Div. 511, 228 N. Y. Supp. 722 (4th Dep't 1928); Sw%-artz v.
White, 80 Utah 150, 13 P. (2d) 643 (1932).
88. See cases cited supra note 63.
89. ILL. LAWS (1895) 109; see NiBLAcK, THE TomNs Sysrmn (1903) 24, n. 27;
HAAs, ToRRENS AND REAL ESTATE DATA FOR COOK CouNT (1927) 6; Heca, Rv1asrnA-
TION OF TILE TO LAND THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE (1920) 52.
90. People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454 (1896) ; State v. Guilbert, 56 Oho St.
575, 47 N. E. 551 (1897).
91. Couey v. Talalah Estates Corp., 183 Ga. 442, 188 S. E. 822 (1935) ; see Tyler v.
Judges, 175 Mass. 71, 82, 55 N. E. 812, 816 (1900) (dissenting opinion); State v. West-
fall, 85 Minn. 437, 89 N. V. 175 (1902) ; Bordwell, supra note 17, at 120; NrotAcn, Tus
Toa RNs Sys~at (1903) 23.
92. fAss. ANN. LAWS (Lawyers Coop., 1933) c. 185, § 1, Weeks %. Brooks, 205
Mass. 458, 92 N. E. 45 (1910); N. Y. RE. PRoP. LAw § 371; N. C. Coos (Michie,
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occasion been held that an administrative officer cannot adjudicate such rights
or interests.
93
In contrast, there has been little contest of the constitutionality of automo-
bile registration statutes, either as constituting a denial of "due process" or
as an undue delegation of judicial powers to administrative officers. When
contested, the acts have usually been sustained, although discretionary func-
tions are almost always vested in the motor vehicle official. 94 In Ohio, for
example, he must use reasonable diligence to ascertain the truth of facts
stated in an application by searching the motor vehicle records, and he can
issue registration certificates only when satisfied that the applicant is entitled
thereto.95 Registration may be refused because the applicant is not financially
responsible, because his car is mechanically unsafe, or because he has per-
mitted an unlawful use of registration or ownership certificates or license
plates; and may be revoked for similar causes after notice and a hearing. Only
six states have established a method of appeal from the acts of the registrar, 0
but usually a writ of mandamus is obtainable to compel performance of
statutory duties by state officers. 97 In cases sustaining the more highly devel-
oped statutes, 98 use of the highways has been deemed not a property right
but a privilege which the legislature can surround with whatever conditions
it finds necessary. 99 But it is doubtful whether such reasoning could with-
1935) c. 47, § 2387; Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S. E. 791 (1921). But cf. Peters
v. Duluth, 119 Minn. 96, 137 N. W. 390 (1912) (registration proceedings are no more
than an enlargement of remedy to quiet title and entail no constitutional right to jury
trial).
93. People v. Chase, 165 Ill. 527, 46 N. E. 454 (1896). Several states have amended
their constitutions to permit performance of judicial powers by an administrative officer
in land registration. OHIo CONsT. Art. II, § 40; PA. CONST. Art. 18, Amend. of 1915
(1937); Cf. VA. CONST. § 100; see Massie, Perfection of the Torrcns System (1917)
2 VA. L. REG. (N.s.) 750, 767.
94. Supra page 1247.
95. OHio GENr. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 6290-5; Cf. CAL. VEHICLE C01% (Deer-
ing, 1937) §§ 149, 182; DEL. Rnv. CODE (1935) §5577; GA. CODn (1933) § 68.206;
Mo. STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1932) c. 41, § 7774 c.
96. ILL. 'REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n, 1937) § 95-1/282; DEL. REv. CoDo (1935) § 5577;
MASS. ANN. LAWS (Lawyer's Coop., 1932) c. 90, §28; N. J. REv. STAT. (1937)
§ 39-10-16; OHio GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1937) § 6296-32; Wis. STAT. (1937)
§ 85.08 (12).
97. Ex parle Schuler, 167 Cal. 282, 139 Pac. 685 (1914); State v. Evans, 77 P.
(2d) 394 (Mont. 1938) ; State v. Taggart, 133 Ohio St. 382, 14 N. E. (2d) 10 (1938);
State v. Guckenberger, 51 Ohio App. 228, 200 N. E. 210 (1935).
98. Under registration statutes which do not impart a conclusive effect to title
papers constitutionality is sustained, either on the ground that the statute is merely a
recording act or that the official has no discretion if the application is in proper form.
See In re Fell, 16 F. Supp. 987, 989 (E. D. Pa. 1936) ; 2 Os. A'rry GEN. 579 (Mass.
1903); La Plante v. State Board Pub. Roads, 47 R. I. 258, 131 Atl. 641 (1926).
99. Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N. J. L. 522, 177 Atl. 882 (Sup. Ct.
1935); Nulter v. State Road Commission, 193 S. E. 549 (W. Va. 1937).
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stand rigorous analysis? °  A more substantial statement, perhaps, is that
registration as an essential element of complete ownership is properly within
the police power.101 In any case, it now seems to be established that while
ministerial officers may not be able to adjudicate adversary claims, they can
make findings of fact and perform at least quasi-judicial functions' -
When added to the fact that automobile registration is universal and com-
pulsory, the significance of this procedure from the point of view of expedi-
ency, ease of administration and minimum expense should be obvious. If the
motor vehicle statutes could be used as precedent, the essential change would
be to dispense with judicial proceedings in the registration of land, and to
substitute a short statute of limitations within which adverse claimants would
be forced to appear, or forever be barred. Thus, a land registration statute
might be enacted to provide that, within a brief statutory period after con-
veyance of any fee simple estate in land, the transferee should be required
to file with the registrar a certified statement of the transfer and an abstract
of title' 0 3 to the land transferred. The registrar would then be required to
use reasonable diligence in searching the land records to ascertain the truth
of the facts stated; and if satisfied, to register the abstract and prepare a
certificate for the land according to "block and lot"; 04 and finally, to note
the liens and encumbrances and the owner's claimed estate upon that cer-
tificate. A duplicate would be issued to the transferee as his certificate of
ownership.
100.. Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U. S. 583 (1926); see Comment (1932) 32
Coi. L. REv. 813, 818.
101. Parke v. Franciscus, 194 Cal. 284, 228 Pac. 435 (1924); tUnwen v. State, 73
N. J. L. 529, 64 Atl. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1905), afr'd, 75 X. J. L. 500, 63 Ad. 110; Opinion of
justices, 250 fass. 591, 148 N. E. 889 (1925).
102 City Loan & Savings Co. v. Taggart, 134 Ohio St. 374, 17 N. E. (2d) 753 (193);
see La Forest v. Board of Commissioners, 92 F. (2d) 547, 549 (App. D. C. 1937). It is
also stated that the official's discretionary acts are merely incidental to hs ministerial
duties. See Garford Trucking Co. v. Hoffman, 114 N. J. L. 522, 527, 177 Ad. 8M2, 8M7
(Sup. Ct 1935) ; cf. Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907) ; People Y.
Simon, 176 Ill. 165 (1898); Drake v. Frazer, 105 Neb. 16?, 179 N. W. 393 (1920). But
cf. Barkenthien v. New York, 155 App. Div. 285, 140 N. Y. Supp. 100 (2d Dep't 1913),
aff'd, 212 N. Y. 36, 105 N. E. 808 (1914), on rehearing 213 N. Y. 554, 107 N. . 1034
(1915).
103. Several of the present Torrens statutes require that an applicant file an abstract
of title made in the regular course of business of abstractors. CAL Gn:. LAws (Deering,
1937) Act 8589, § 5; CoLo. Arx. STAT. (Mills, 1930) § 871; Itr.. r. STAT. (Bar Ass'n
1937) c. 30, § 62; Stolle v. Mitchell, 309 Il. 341, 141 N. . 136 (1923). It is suggested
that, if the transferee were the one required to register initially, it would expedite trans-
fers as the transferee would not be delayed in obtaining possession. Cf. BLLu. FzvZAL
FAuu LOAN BuRrAu, LAinD Tn x RxGisTRA'nox NB CErzFicArn (1918) 38.
104. The "block and lot" system now exists in several states and has received favor-
able comment. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1937) Act 8589, § 102; Onjo GE:N. CoDE A:;:-.
(Page, 1937) § 8572-30; N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW §§ 381, 382; see Jenks, Land Transfer
Reform (1891) 2 ANNALs 48, 56; Nrar.acK, THE TonuNxs Svsnrr (1903) 110; cf. HoGG,
REGISTRATION OF TiTLE TO LAND THROUGHOUT THE EMPIRE (1920) 47.
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The exact nature of a procedure for land registration which national and
state constitutions would permit cannot always be predicted, but at least
compliance with "due process" does not necessarily require a judicial pro-
ceeding, 05 despite the legal literature associated with the first American
Torrens statutes. The fact that a procedure adopted would be new in form
does not preclude its constitutionality, since convenience and substantial
justice are the general criteria.'0 0 Titles to real estate and the public registry
of them, like titles to automobiles, have been deemed important to the general
welfare and subject to a reasonable exercise of the police power.1° 7 It has
already been determined that a legislature may provide for land to be trans-
ferred only by entering the transfer on a register, and for rights in or claims
to land to be preserved and protected only by filing notice of the adverse
claims to title.'08
None the less, the conclusiveness of initial registration requires certain
qualifications in order to be constitutionally permissible. For, as already
recognized in regard to land, there may be, in many instances, liens and
encumbrances, and interests other than those of a possible occupant of the
land, adverse to the asserted title of a petitioner at the time of initial regis-
tration. Thus, the registrar's act of originally registering the abstract of
title could not be made conclusive in view of repeated holdings that a legis-
lature cannot determine what constitutes conclusive evidence. 100 The sug-
gestion is that registration of title by the registrar may be made prima facic
evidence,110 the title to become indefeasible unless protested during a statutory
period within which adverse parties, other than occupants, would be required
to register their claims. A somewhat longer period in which to attack any act
of registration on grounds of fraud might be provided, as in some of the
present Torrens statutes."' Undoubtedly, a statute of limitations of this type
105. "Due process" does not always mean proceedings in court. Its fundamental re-
quirement is an opportunity for a hearing and a defense. See Ballard v. Hunter, 204
U. S. 241, 255 (1907).
106. See Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass. 71, 74, 55 N. E. 812, 813 (1900).
107. United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 (1877); Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316
(1890); American Land Co. v. Zeiss, 219 U. S. 47 (1911); see Fairchild, JEconomlie
Aspects of Land Titles (1937) 22 CoRer. L. Q. 229, 237.
108. Jackson v. Lamphire, 3 Pet. 280 (U. S. 1830); In re Seick, 46 Cal. App. 363,
189 Pac. 314 (1920); Evans v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 317 Ill. 11, 147 N. E, 412
(1925); Salmon v. Huff, 28 S. W. 1044 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); see Fairchild and Glue,
Various Aspects of Compulsory Land Title Registration (1938) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rrx.
545, 561; Niblack, The Conclusiveness of Torrens Certificates of Title (1913) 19 CAs1 l
& Comr. 727, 728.
109. See Niblack, Pivotal Points in the Torrens System (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 274,
281.
110. It is within the scope of legislative power to make the report of a sworn public
officer evidence of facts to which the report relates. See Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 120,
134, 108 S. E. 791, 794 (1921). And it is constitutional not to require notice befote
exercise of ministerial acts. See Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51, 57 (1902).
111. GA. CODE (1933) § 60-419; N. Y. REAL PRop. LAW § 392; Orno G u. Co0s At.
(Page, 1937) § 8572-22.
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is within the constitutional power of a state to enacL'^ Time and the chance
it gives an interested party to find that he is in danger of losing his rights
have been deemed "due process of law" in like circumstances. 13
A further necessary qualification must be considered. Under existing regis-
tration statutes, most states do not require that an applicant be in possession
to register, but in all cases, under existing statutes, the party in possession
must be served with summons to appear and may assert his claims in the
initial judicial proceeding. It has been stated, however; as a constitutional
principle that the interests of a party in possession of land cannot be defeated
by a statute of limitations for not asserting his claims against the adverse
claims of another party.114 Therefore, in view of the defeasance features
suggested, the applicant would be required to file the certified permission of
his tenant in possession, if any, with his original application. If that per-
mission were not forthcoming and the occupant of the land were asserting
an adverse claim, it would be necessary for the applicant to initiate registra-
tion proceedings as provided under present Torrens statutes, and to adjudicate
his rights before a proper tribunal. Finally, in the event of all types of
disputes not settled between the parties15 regarding registration of adverse
claims, it might be provided that the registrar frame the issues110 and certify
an appeal to a court of registration, and the parties would proceed as on
an appeal from the acts of a registrar of motor vehicles. In states which do
not countenance an appeal from the acts of an administrative officer, n7 either
party could obtain an adjudication of his rights through a writ of mandamus.
Once universal initial registration could be accomplished, scarcely any con-
stitutional problem would remain. Under the motor vehicle statutes the
registrar has been permitted to perform discretionary functions in registering
encumbrances on and transfers of registered land. While to some com-
112. Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90 (1897) ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Rob-
erts, 177 U. S. 318 (1900). Analogies are common law fines [see 2 BL. Co.mm. *353,354;
Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, 150 Cal. 289, 313, SS Pac. 35t6, 351
(1906)] and a judgment on a writ of right after the mise joined and the lapse of a
year and a day [BooTH, R.AL Acrioxs (1811) 101 margin].
113. See Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass. 71, 74, 55 N. E. 812, 813 (1900) ; Doty v. Love,
295 U. S. 64, 70 (1935) ; It; re 1175 Evergreen Ave., 270 N. Y. 436, 442, 1 N. F. (2d)
838, 840 (1936).
114. See People v. Simon, 176 Ill. 165, 177, 52 N. E. 910, 914 (1893); 2 Coo=rt, CorN-
sTrToNAL LnxrTios (Carrington, 8th ed. 1927) 763; Bum. FE=nAL FAn,_ Lo.%zT
BuREAu, op. cit. supra note 51 at 38; cf. People v. Ladew, 189 N. Y. 355, 82 N. E. 431
(1907).
115. Cf. Hoco, RmismnrAio- or TITLE THROUGHOUT TnE E sr (1920) 52.
116. See Crowell v. Aldn, 152 Ga. 126, 134, 108 S. E. 791, 796 (1921); Jamieson &
Bond Co. v. Reynolds, 169 App. Div. 107, 109, 154 N. Y. Supp. 836, 838 (2d Dep't 1915).
117. Ohio once denied the possibility of an appeal from an administrative officer [Exr
parte Logan Branch Bank, 1 Ohio St. 432 (1853)], but presumably a different attitude
now prevails, particularly in states providing for a judicial appeal from the acts of a
registrar of motor vehicles. See statutes cited supra, note 96.
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mentators these duties appear no less judicial in nature than original pro-
ceedings, 118 constitutionality has also been established in the land cases on
the ground that at the time of subsequent registration all prior claims and
interests are already determined by the certificate of title, and the registrar
merely notes subsequent interests as they appear.110 Without any radical
change in existing Torrens procedure, the registrar may be permitted to note
subsequent transfers and encumbrances on a certificate of title and such
notations may be made conclusive except, possibly, in case of fraud.
The procedure outlined would retard marketability of land only temporarily,
if at all. For, once ownership and interests in land were registered in a
conclusive title instrument, both security and marketing transactions would
in many instances be made possible for the first time 120 and would in all
instances be facilitated. The suggestion that land registration be made com-
pulsory upon the transfer of any title or interest in land is based on ex-
perience,' 21 which has shown that the inertia associated with ownership of real
estate deters acceptance of any new title registration system. In contrast,
the compulsory registration of automobiles has promoted an accepted system
consonant with modern commercial practices. Furthermore, under the method
outlined compulsory registration would be graduated over a period of years
so as to avoid the virtually impossible task of immediate registration of all
real estate. While existing Torrens statutes would still perform a useful
function 122 in providing for adjudication of disputed claims and therefore
should not be discarded, 23 the additions suggested should eventually approach
the achievements so vainly sought through the enactment of the existing
statutes.
118. See Niblack, Pivotal Points in the Torrens System (1915) 24 YALE L. J. 274,
279.
119. Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 90 Pac. 129 (1907) ; People v. Crissman, 41
Colo. 450, 92 Pac. 949 (1907) ; White v. Ainsworth, 62 Colo. 513, 163 Pac. 959 (1917);
Crowell v. Akin, 152 Ga. 126, 108 S. E. 791 (1921); People v. Simon, 176 Il. 165, 52
N. E. 910 (1898) ; Drake v. Frazer, 105 Neb. 162, 179 N. W. 393 (1920) ; Jamieson &
Bond Co. v. Reynolds, 169 App. Div. 107, 154 N. Y. Supp. 836 (2d Dep't 1915).
120. See Laddey, The Torrens System of Land Registration (1931) 54 N. J. L. J.
42.
121. See Fairchild & Gluck, supra note 108, at 550; Lehman, Message to the Legis-
lature, N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1938, p. 14, col. 1, 2.
122. See Swartzel, Torrens Title Registration (1922) 19 Omo L. B. & R. (N.s.)
679, 680.
123. Doubt has been expressed as to whether the Torrens law could ever be consti-
tutionally repealed. See (1933) 5 Rocxy MT. L. REV. 149, 150.
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